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VIII. CRIMINAL LAW
Mail Fraud
In United States v. Mandel," the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the federal mail fraud statute may be used to prosecute political bribery
and corruption in the absence of any state or federal laws governing
disclosure of a public official's interest.2 The Fourth Circuit heard the
Mandel case twice.3 In Mandel I 4 a Fourth Circuit panel court decided
that the mail fraud statute was a proper prosecutorial vehicle for
convicting the defendants of a scheme to defraud the people of Maryland
of their right to conscientious and honest government.5 The court
determined, however, that remand and reversal of Mandel I were
necessary because of trial court error in refusing to give certain jury
instructions.8 In Mandel II,7 the Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed the
602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc); 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
2 602 F.2d at 653; 591 F.2d at 1357; see 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The defendants were
also charged with violating the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, see 591 F.2d at 1352.
See also S. REP. No. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 922, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CoNo. &
AD. NEWS 1073, 1073. The Act prohibits the use of funds obtained from a pattern of racke-
teering activity such as political bribery for the purpose of acquiring an interest in any
enterprise affecting interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1977). The district court de-
termined that an alleged gift of stock to Mandel by Mandel's co-defendant did not consti-
tute an acquisition of control sufficient for the purposes of the racketeering act. United
States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1020-22 (D. Md. 1976). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
racketeering acquittals. See 602 F.2d at 653; 591 F.2d at 1374-76. The Mandel panel deci-
sion also determined that the district court did not commit error in denying one defendant's
severance motion because the defendant failed to make the requisite strong showing of
prejudice. 591 F.2d at 1371.
- 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979); 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979). The Fourth Circuit sitting
en banc considered only those defense claims discussed in the first hearing of the Mandel
case by the Fourth Circuit panel court. 602 F.2d at 657 (Widener, J., dissenting). The panel
court omitted discussion of many appellants' claims because the case was reversed and re-
manded for trial error. See 602 F.2d at 657 (Widener, J., dissenting); 591 F.2d at 1357.
4 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
5 See id. at 1361, 1364.
6 Id. at 1357, 1365-66. The Mandel I court also considered whether certain
prosecutorial evidence was erroneously admitted at trial. Id. at 1367. The evidence, obtained
from Maryland state senators' testimony, concerned the questibn whether Mandel had influ-
enced the Maryland legislature's disposition of certain horse-racing bills. See 591 F.2d at
1367. The evidence included statements of persons other than Mandel or his agents, and
was admissable, if at all, only under the general residuary exception to the hearsay rule,
Rule 803(24), Federal Rules of Evidence. The Mandel I court determined that the trial
court erred in admitting the senators' testimony under Rule 803(24) because the statements
were the product of senatorial rumor and exaggeration. 591 F.2d at 1367, 1369. The rule
against hearsay was formulated to exclude clear examples of untrustworthy statements from
factual determinations. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the senators' testimony concerning
Mandel's alleged promotion of the two horse-racing bills was hearsay and therefore improp-
erly admitted by the trial court into evidence. Id.
602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979).
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defendants' convictions without discussion."
Both Mandel I and 11 involved the former governor of Maryland,
Marvin Mandel.' Governor Mandel was found guilty of violating the mail
fraud statute by using the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. 10
The purpose of the alleged scheme was to use Mandel's influence as
governor to obtain legislation which would increase the number of racing
days for the benefit of a horse-racing track owned by Mandel's co-
defendants.1 The defendant-trackowners allegedly provided Mandel with
financial and material benefits in return for Mandel's promotion of two
s Id. at 653.
See 602 F.2d at 653; 591 F.2d at 1352.
10 591 F.2d at 1352. The federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), provides in
part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses...
for the purpose of executing such scheme ... or attempting so to do, places in
any post office ... any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing or know-
ingly causes to be delivered by mail any such matter or thing... shall be fined
... or imprisoned ... or both.
The fraud element of § 1341 is not limited to common-law fraud which requires a false or
fraudulent representation as to some past or present event. See, e.g., Badders v. United
States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916); Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1896);
United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 496 (4th Cir. 1975). Fraud for the purposes of § 1341
is defined as statements made with knowledge of their falsity and their likelihood to deceive
or mislead persons of ordinary prudence. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997,
1006 (D. Md. 1976). See generally Comment, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL.
L. F. 237, 238 [hereinafter cited as Survey].
The defendant's actual use of the mails is not required by § 1341 if the defendant has
caused the mails to be used in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. See Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954); United States v. Perkal, 530 F.2d 604, 606 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976). The mailing must lie made in furtherance of the scheme to
defraud. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 402, 405 (1974). Mailings which are tangential
to the fraudulent scheme, or which occur merely as a by-product of the scheme, do not
violate the mail fraud statute. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 391 (1960); United
States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1974).
11 591 F.2d at 1353. The original owners of the Marlboro racetrack had attempted to
obtain additional racing-day authorization from the Maryland legislature. Id. at 1354. The
number of racing days permitted at each track is a valuable consideration for racetrack
owners in terms of both daily revenue and possible racing fees. Brief for Appellants at 23.
Permanent transfer of racing days from one licensed track to another requires approval of
the Maryland General Assembly. MD. AN. CODE. art 78B §§ 7(a-c) (repl. 1975). Governor
Mandel vetoed the proposed house bill authorizing an increase of racing days at the Marl-
boro track. 591 F.2d at 1354. A few months after Mandel's veto of the bill, Mandel's co-
defendants purchased the Marlboro track. Id. The figure-head president and purported
owner of the track successfully petitioned the Maryland House of Delegates to override
Mandel's veto and to transfer the increased number of racing days to the Marlboro track.
Id. Mandel also lobbied unsuccessfully in favor of another house bill which would have in-
creased the statutorily restricted number of racing days for all racetracks, and doubled the
permitted racing days at Marlboro. Id. at 1355.
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horse-racing bills favorable to the defendant-owners' track.12 Neither
Mandel nor his co-defendants disclosed the financial benefits to Mandel
or the co-defendants' ownership of the track. s Mandel claimed that
application of the mail fraud statute to his acts was an improper
extension of the statute's scope because the defendants' failure to reveal
Mandel's benefits did not violate existing state or federal law. 4
The Mandel I court was concerned that the use of the federal mail
fraud statute to prosecute bribery of state officials was an overextension
of the statute's scope. 5 The court concluded that the lack of any state
law regarding political bribery did not determine the propriety of
applying the mail fraud statute to Mandel's actions.' 6 The court based its
conclusion on an inquiry into the purpose of the mail fraud statute. 7 In
concert with other circuits and the Fourth Circuit's own precedent, the
Mandel I court stated that Congress enacted the mail fraud statute not to
monitor the substance of a fraudulent scheme but rather to prevent use
of the federal mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud.' 8 The Mandel
12 591 F.2d at 1356. The alleged material benefits to Mandel consisted of stock in two
companies and various "gifts" of clothing and jewelry. Id. Mandel alleged that the stock in
one company was payment for legal services rendered to one of Mandel's co-defendants. Id.
Mandel paid one dollar per share for the stock in the second company, which was listed
improperly as belonging to another of Mandel's co-defendants. Id.
13 591 F.2d at 1356, 1357.
14 Id. at 1357. At the time the indictments of Mandel and his co-defendants were is-
sued, owners of stock in Maryland horseracing tracks were not required to identify them-
selves if they were beneficial rather than outright owners. Brief for Appellants at 46-47; see
MD. ANN. CODE art 78B § 13(c) (repl. 1975). Maryland statutes did not require disclosure of
a public official's interest in any matter under that official's consideration. See United
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1354 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp.
997, 1009 (D. Md. 1976); Brief for Appellants at 46-47. But see MD. ANN. CODE. art 40A §§
3-101 to 3-108 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (new regulations requiring disclosure).
15 591 F.2d at 1357-58.
l Id. The necessary elements of mail fraud are a use of the mails and a scheme to
defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976); see note 10 supra. Violation of any law, therefore, is not
necessary for a mail fraud indictment. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393
(1916).
" See 591 F.2d at 1358, 1360. The court in Mandel I inquired into the purpose of the
mail fraud statute to avoid expansion of the statute beyond congressionally intended limits
by strictly construing the terms of the statute. See id. at 1357. Other circuits have inquired
into the purpose of the statute to determine whether a mail fraud indictment is sufficient
and whether there is any infringement of the constitutional protection against unwarranted
extensions of federal law under the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
See, e.g., United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004, 1005-06, 1010 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 929 (1976) (defendant convicted for mail fraud in supplying improper real estate
tax information); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909 (1974) (mail fraud involving improper election procedures). Inquiry into the stat-
ute's purpose is also proper in determining the meaning of the statutory phrase "scheme to
defraud". See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
15 591 F.2d at 1358; see Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960); United States v.
Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 1975) (purpose of § 1341 to prevent misuse of mail as
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I court emphasized that the proper inquiry in determining the
applicability of the mail fraud statute to any fraudulent scheme furthered
by a use of the mail is whether the scheme satisfies the statute's fraud
elements. 19 The object of an actionable fraudulent scheme need not be
monetary gain, but may be to deprive individuals of intangible rights.
20
The Fourth Circuit determined that any infringement of the right of
citizens to the unbiased judgment of a public official could be an object of
a fraudulent scheme within the scope of the mail fraud statute. 21 When a
public official undermines his impartiality by accepting a bribe, that
official defrauds the public of its right to his disinterested service.22 The
Mandel I court concluded that bribery of a public official is fraud
sufficient for the purposes of the mail fraud statute.
23
Impartiality is not the only duty which a public official owes to the
electorate.24 A public official must act in matters of public concern in
criminal tool); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909 (1974) (§ 1341 created to prevent illegal use of mails).
19 591 F.2d at 1362. Congress has never defined the elements of a scheme to defraud for
the purposes of the mail fraud statute. See United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248
(8th Cir. 1976). Courts have broadly construed "scheme to defraud" to include schemes in-
volving deceptions contrary to public policy. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389
(1960). Other courts have used a more general fraud standard including violations of hon-
esty and fair play as part of "scheme to defraud". See United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534,
545 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d
665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967).
Fraud sufficient for a mail fraud indictment may consist of outright intentional decep-
tions. United States v. New South Farm & Home Co., 241 U.S. 64, 71 (1916). Fraud may
also be found in instances of knowing and deliberate concealments of material facts. See
Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp.
997, 1006-07 (D. Md. 1976). See also Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction
in Fraud and Corruption Cases: Losing the Battle Against White Collar Crime, 11 Am.
CaM. L. REv. 959, 960 (1973).
10 591 F.2d at 1361. The language of § 1341 indicates three possible objects of a fraudu-
lent scheme: a mere defrauding, obtaining money, or receiving property. 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976). See also Survey, note 10 supra at 245-46; Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110,
115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941) (overruled on other grounds, United States
v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 412 n. 8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1007-08 (D. Md. 1976).
21 591 F.2d at 1362, 1363.
22 See id. at 1363. Bribery of a public official involves the fraudulent exercise of influ-
ence over his judgment in his official actions. See United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374
(8th Cir. 1976). Even in the absence of a state prohibition against bribery of public officials,
courts will infer that bribery is a proper element of mail fraud in situations involving a
breach of duty of loyalty or disinterested service. Survey, note 10 supra, at 245; see, e.g.
Perrin v. United States, 100 S.Ct. 311, 313 (1979) (Travel Act "bribery" includes bribery of
private persons to disseminate private corporations' business records); Shushan v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941) (overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Craz, 478 F.2d 408, 412 n. 8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973) (government official has most sacred duty of any type of trustee).
23 591 F.2d at 1362.
2, See id. at 1363.
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compliance with an official's duties of honesty and loyalty.2 5 An elected
official stands as a fiduciary trustee for the citizens' interests, and must
therefore reveal any personal interest or concern which might divide that
official's sense of loyalty between public and private concerns.26 An
elected official may also have a duty to disclose personal interests to the
legislature, especially when that official possesses political influence in
matters under legislative consideration.2 7 The Mandel I court emphasized
that a breach of a public official's duty to reveal or disclose any personal
interests must be coupled with a fraudulent act to come within the ambit
of the mail fraud statute.28 In order to constitute actionable fraud, an
official's deliberate omission or misstatement of information about his
personal interests must be accompanied by evidence of that official's
knowledge of the information.2 9 The panel court held in Mandel I that
Mandel's failure to inform the Maryland legislature of his personal
interest in obtaining enactment of two horse-racing bills was a breach of
Mandel's fiduciary duty of honesty and loyalty to Maryland citizens."
Breach of Mandel's duty constituted fraud under the mail fraud statute. 1
Since the mail fraud indictments could have been submitted on
alternate theories of bribery, non-disclosure, or both, the panel court
determined that the defendants' challenge to the jury instructions
merited close consideration.3 2 The Fourth Circuit stated that the trial
25 Id. Officials' duties of honesty arise because of the relationship between that official
and the public. See United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
28 591 F.2d at 1363. The Governor of the State of Maryland is a trustee for the citizens
and the state. MD. CONST. CODE ANN. art. 6 (1977). The failure of a governmental trustee to
disclose a personal interest in decisions affecting the state violates the public's right to hon-
est and disinterested government. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 114-15 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941) (overruled on other grounds, United States v. Cruz,
478 F.2d 408, 412 n. 8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
27 591 F.2d at 1363-64.
28 Id. at 1363.
29 Id.; see note 10 supra. An omission is classified as a fraudulent act under the statute.
See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896). The court must find that an offi-
cial's breach of fiduciary duties by omitting information is accompanied by fraudulent in-
tent. See United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
976 (1976); Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1007-08 (D. Md. 1976).
10 591 F.2d at 1363. Fraud is a specific intent crime which requires evidence that the
defrauder consciously and with full knowledge of the fraud deliberately misrepresented or
did not disclose material information. Id. at 1363 n. 11; United States v. Mandel, 415 F.
Supp. 997, 1007-08 (D. Md. 1976). Mandel therefore had to have knowledge of the true
identities of the race-track owners in order to be able to conceal that information from the
legislature in an intentionally deceptive manner. 591 F.2d at 1365.
31 591 F.2d at 1364; see Survey, note 10 supra, at 241-42. See also note 30 supra.
22 See 591 F.2d at 1364. An appellate court will reverse a case because of trial error
concerning jury instructions when the instructions are incorrect as a matter of law or are so
insufficiently phrased that the jury would necessarily be confused as to the proper elements
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court should have instructed the jury on the nature of bribery because
bribery was a possible foundation for the fraud element of the mail fraud
statute.33 The Mandel I court determined that the absence of any
instruction on the law of bribery for the mail fraud charges permitted the
jury to convict Mandel for mail fraud without comprehending the
essential difference between bribes and goodwill expenditures. 3' Bribery
requires a finding that an object was given with the specific intent by the
giver to receive some benefit in retur. 35 A goodwill expenditure, on the
other hand, is given without any thought of political or other benefit.3 6 In
the absence of any bribery instruction, the panel court reasoned that the
jury was incapable of determining the proper basis for one of the two
possible theories of mail fraud.3 7 Thus the trial court's refusal to give a
mail fraud bribery instruction was reversible error.38
The Fourth Circuit also found reversible error in the trial court's
refusal to give Mandel's proffered jury instruction on the specific need to
find that Mandel knew the identities of the racetrack owners.39 The court
emphasized that Mandel's knowledge was a prerequisite to any finding
that he had concealed information from the legislature of Maryland with
requisite fraudulent intent.40 The court concluded that the jury may have
found Mandel guilty without recognizing that intent to defraud requires
knowledge and concealment of material information.41 A conviction which
is not clearly based on findings by the jury of all the necessary elements
of each alleged crime. See Trusty, The Value of Clear Instructions, 15 U. KAN. CITY L. REV.
9, 10-11 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Trusty].
33 591 F.2d at 1364-65. The trial court refused to give a bribery instruction for the mail
fraud counts, but fully defined bribery for the racketeering counts. Id. at 1379 (Butzner, J.,
dissenting). A defendant is entitled to jury instructions on any defense theory of law. See C.
WRIGHT AND J. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL § 485 at 292 n. 53
[hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT AND J. MILLER]; Bowmer, Jones & Miller, The Charge in
Criminal Cases, 12 BAYLOR L. REV. 261, 265 (1960).
:4 591 F.2d at 1365.
11 Id. at 1365-66. For the proper definition of bribery, the Mandel I court relied on a
Fourth Circuit decision, United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976). See 591
F.2d at 1365. Under Arthur, not every gift presented to a public official constitutes bribery.
Instead, a distinction must be made between gifts given out of good will and gifts given with
an intent to receive something in return. 544 F.2d at 735.
36 591 F.2d at 1365. See also Perrin v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 311, 314-15 (1979)
(history of the law of bribery).
37 591 F.2d at 1365.
:8 See id.
9 Id. The dissent in Mandel I noted that the trial court accepted Mandel's instruction
regarding knowledge, but chose to express the instruction in a more colloquial fashion. See
id. at 1379 (Butzner, J., dissenting). While a defendant has no right to have his particular
instruction read to the jury, a court must give correct instructions. Winslow, The Instruc-
tion Ritual, 13 HASTINGS L. REV. 456, 456, 458 (1962). Although trial judges have discretion
in phrasing jury instructions, that discretion does not extend to creating a jury charge which
fails to inform the jury of every element of every crime. See Note, 28 ARK. L. REv. 406, 409
(1974); 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 51.04 n.5 at 2518, 2521; Supp. at 34-35 (1979).
40 591 F.2d at 1365-66; see text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
41 591 F.2d at 1365-66.
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must be reversed if the error were the result of improper trial court
instructions. 42 The Fourth Circuit held that reversible error was
committed by the trial court when that court failed to give a proper
instruction defining the necessity of Mandel's knowledge for mail fraud.
4
3
The dissent in Mandel I relied on a careful reading of the jury charges
as a whole, concluding that the trial court fully and properly instructed
the jury on the elements of bribery and nondisclosure in light of Mandel's
knowledge. 44 The dissent reasoned that no bribery instruction for the
purposes of the mail fraud statute was necessary because the trial court
later gave an instruction on the law of bribery for the purposes of a
different indictment of Mandel's co-defendants. 5 The dissent emphasized
that dual instructions on bribery would needlessly prolong the trial and
possibly confuse the jury.46 The Mandel I dissent's position apparently
was based on a belief that the trial court economized trial time and fully
informed the jury on the bribery element of the mail fraud indictment by
giving the single bribery charge for another indictment.4 7 The dissent's
approach, however, failed to recognize the fundamental rule regarding
jury instructions which requires a definition of each element of every
alleged crime. 48 The jury instructions were given over a period of days
with each instruction pertaining only to the specific crime alleged. This
suggests that the trial court possibly separated the definition of bribery
from the bribery element required for a mail fraud conviction. 49 As a
result, the jury may have convicted Mandel for mail fraud on the basis of
financial benefits which were not clearly distinguished as bribes from
mere goodwill benefits.50 The trial court's general knowledge instruction
was given without reference to any particular element of the alleged
crimes at the very end of the instruction period.5 1 Thus the jury could
42 See id. See also C. WRIGHT AND J. MILLER supra note 33, § 485 at 292-93 (1969).
43 591 F.2d at 1365-66.
4 591 F.2d at 1378 (Butzner, J. dissenting).
45 Id. at 1379 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
46 See id. at 1377, 1378 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
4 Id. There is some conflict between the dissenting opinions in Mandel I and II con-
cerning the basis for the trial court's refusal to give the proferred bribery instructions for
the mail fraud counts. 602 F.2d at 655 (Widener, J., dissenting); 591 F.2d at 1379 (Butzner,
J., dissenting). According to the Mandel II dissent, the government insisted that the trial
court omit the bribery instruction because bribery was not an element of the mail fraud
indictment under the government's interpretation. 602 F.2d at 654-55. At the time the trial
court prepared to instruct the jury in Mandel, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v.
Arthur, 544 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1976), which defined the law of bribery in terms of proper
jury instructions. Perhaps the government realized that under the Arthur instructions the
Mandel jury might not find that financial benefits to Mandel were clearly bribes as opposed
to goodwill benefits. Therefore the government may have decided to remove any considera-
tion of the nature of the alleged bribery from the jury in order to prevent part of the mail
fraud indictment from failing.
41 See Trusty, supra note 32 at 11-12.'See also note 32 supra.
49 Brief for Appellants at 39-43.
50 See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
51 602 F.2d at 655 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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have convicted Mandel for violating the mail fraud statute without
finding that he fraudulently intended to conceal material information
from the Maryland legislature."3 The Mandel I dissent's opinion on jury
instruction apparently was accepted by half of the en banc court in
Mandel 11.13 In Mandel I the equal split of the en banc court left the
controversy surrounding the jury instructions unresolved."
The Mandel II court, however, did not divide on the issue of the use
of the federal mail fraud statute in bribery prosecutions.5 5 Other circuits
have determined that the scope of the fraud element of the mail fraud'
statute must be broadly construed.56 In the absence of congressional
mandates to the contrary, courts must examine the elements of the
scheme to defraud to determine the propriety of mail fraud prosecutions
for fraudulent acts traditionally within the purview of state regulation."7
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Maze,5' noted that any fraud
which deprives an individual of an acknowledged possession, whether
physical, monetary, or ephemeral, is an actionable fraud when coupled
with use of the federal mails in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.59
The Fourth Circuit in Mandel I and II furthered Congress' desire to
prevent fraudulent misuse of the mail without expanding the scope of the
mail fraud statute.60 As the Supreme Court stated, fraud of any type is an
offense against public policy, but fraud which involves the use of the mail
is an offense against federal law designed to create a system of valid
interpersonal communication upon which societal and business
interactions depend.61 While federal law enforcement agents cannot
prosecute fraud in areas which are the proper concern of the states under
the Constitution, those officials may combat fraud in any area which is
under the control of Congress, including the federal mails.2
SusAN ANDREWS LESLIE
:2 See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
602 F.2d at 653; id. at 657 (Widener, J., dissenting).
See id. at 653; see United States v. Mandel, 609 F.2d 1076, 1076 (4th Cir. 1979)
(Widener, J., dissenting) (order denying rehearing).
602 F.2d at 653; see 591 F.2d at 1357-58.
8' See 591 F.2d at 1361 and cases cited therein.
:7 See note 19 supra.
58 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
59 Id. at 405; see Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1954); Durland v. United
States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
:0 See 602 F.2d at 653; 591 F.2d at 1361.
1 Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960); see Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391, 393 (1916).
62 United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 1975); Gouled v. United States
273 F. 506, 508 (2d Cir.), afld, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
